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INTRODUCTION: COMPETING MODELS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS 
he National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
Constitution sets forth the ideals that its member educational 
institutions are supposed to follow in collectively governing 
intercollegiate athletics in the United States.1 It expressly states that 
the NCAA’s objective is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an 
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral 
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”2 It also states that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated 
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits 
to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation 
by professional and commercial enterprises.”3 Another key 
constitutional principle states that “programs shall be administered in 
keeping with prudent management and fiscal practices to assure the 
financial stability necessary for providing student-athletes with 
 
1 NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 2.1–2.16 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. 
2 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1. 
3 Id. § 2.9. 
T
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adequate opportunities for athletics competition as an integral part of 
a quality educational experience.”4 
Professor Timothy Davis has characterized this idealized view of 
intercollegiate athletics as the “amateur/education model.”5 This 
“amateurism” component may accurately describe Division III 
intercollegiate sports competition and student-athletes, and to some 
extent also Division I and II women’s and men’s sports that do not 
generate net revenues in excess of their production costs. Consistent 
with its educational component, student-athletes’ participation in 
intercollegiate athletics provides several academic and future career 
benefits. For example, a 2007 NCAA study of 8000 former student-
athletes reveals that: (1) eighty-eight percent of student-athletes earn 
their baccalaureate degrees, compared to less than twenty-five percent 
of the American adult population; (2) ninety-one percent of former 
Division I student-athletes are employed full-time, eleven percent 
more than the general population, and enjoy higher average income 
levels than non-student-athletes; (3) eighty-nine percent of former 
student-athletes believe the skills and values learned from 
participating in intercollegiate athletics helped them obtain their 
current employment in a career other than playing professional sports; 
and (4) twenty-seven percent of former Division I student-athletes 
earn a postgraduate degree.6 
Davis contrasts the way in which most collegiate sports operate 
with how universities in the most popular and successful athletic 
conferences (e.g., ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 12, SEC) operate “big-
time” in Division I men’s basketball and football programs.7 These 
 
4 Id. § 2.16. 
5 Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting 
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270 (1994) (emphasis added). 
6 Gary T. Brown, Research Validates Value, and Values, of Athletics, NCAA.ORG (Feb. 
12, 2007, 1:01 AM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2007/Association-wide 
/research%2Bvalidates%2Bvalue,%2Band%2Bvalues,%2Bof%2Bathletics%2B-%2B02-1 
2-07%2Bncaa%2Bnews.html. A 2013 study showed that eighty-two percent of student-
athletes who enrolled in colleges in 2006 have earned their degrees. Michelle Brutlag 
Hosick, Division I Student-Athletes Make the Grade, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/division-i-student-athletes-make  
-grade. These numbers are vastly improved from the landmark study of Long and Caudill. 
See generally James E. Long & Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in 
Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and Graduation, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 525 (1991). 
7 See Davis, supra note 5, at 276 n.33. The NCAA responded to increased 
commercialization, particularly with regard to television revenues and the desire for a 
postseason playoff for schools unlikely to receive postseason bowl invitations, by dividing 
Division I schools for purposes of football into discrete subdivisions, originally Division I-
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two sports are based on a “commercial/education model,” which 
“assumes that college sports is a commercial enterprise subject to the 
same economic considerations as any other industry.”8 At the outset, 
it is important to recognize that the enormous popularity and 
commercialization of college sports is not a recent phenomenon. The 
first intercollegiate athletic competition, a rowing competition 
between Harvard and Yale in 1852, was sponsored by a railroad 
seeking to attract passengers via its new route to the lake on which 
this event took place.9 In the 1890s, football teams from prominent 
universities played before large crowds of exuberant students and 
alumni.10 In the nineteenth century, members of successful Harvard 
rowing teams were paid monetary prizes ranging from $100 to 
$500.11 In 1906, when the NCAA was founded, some college baseball 
players also played in summer professional baseball leagues.12 At the 
time of its founding in 1896, the Big Ten Conference permitted two 
athletes on the schools’ football teams to be professionals in that 
sport.13 The 1929 Carnegie Report noted the rampant 
commercialization of intercollegiate sports with accompanying abuses 
such as corruption, exploitation, and professionalism.14 
The steadily increasing trend of commercialization, which has been 
fueled in recent years by new media technologies needing popular 
 
A and I-AA, later renamed as the Football Bowl Subdivision and the Football 
Championship Subdivision. Kemper C. Powell, A Façade of Amateurism: An Examination 
of the NCAA Grant-in-Aid System Under the Sherman Act, 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 244–
45 (2013). Recent NCAA structural reforms are likely to further reorganize big-time 
college football governance, as members of the largest football conferences will attain 
additional self-governing autonomy. Nicole Auerbach, NCAA Debate on Changes to 
Governance Structure to Continue, USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/college/2014/01/18/ncaa-convention-closes-governance/4640857/. 
8 Davis, supra note 5, at 279. 
9 Andrew Zimbalist, Inequality in Intercollegiate Athletics: Origins, Trends and 
Policies, 6 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 5, 5 (2013). 
10 J. Davenport, From Crew to Commercialism—The Paradox of Sport in Higher 
Education, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 218, 218 (Timothy C. 
Davis, Alfred D. Mathewson & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 1999). 
11 Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and 
Compensation, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 223, 
224. 
12 See, e.g., Charlie Bevis, Walter Clarkson, SOC’Y AM. BASEBALL RES., http://sabr.org 
/bioproj/person/b2cd1049 (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
13 On the Issues with Mike Gousha: NCAA President Mark Emmert, MARQUETTE 
UNIV. (Sept. 16, 2013), http://law-media.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/604e43c2fe1a4fda 
88f65338d1b853ca1d. 
14 John L. Griffith, The Carnegie Reports: Another View of the Study of College 
Athletics Made by the Carnegie Foundation, 1 J. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 325–27 (1930). 
MITTEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  12:17 PM 
2014] A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values 841 
and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics 
content to attract viewers and advertisers––sports is one of the few 
things that millions of people watch live15––should not be surprising. 
The United States marketplace responds to cultural forces and strong 
public demand for popular products such as intercollegiate football 
and basketball games. Thus, the commercialization of college sports 
directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society. 
Commercialization also responds to social needs: history 
demonstrates that humans have a primal need to compete physically 
or witness athletic competitions. Intercollegiate athletics competition 
energizes both participating athletes and spectators, a wide and 
diverse interconnected tribal group that includes athletes’ family 
members and friends, university students, faculty, administration, 
alumni, non-alumni supporters, and thousands of others.16 The 
undeniable magnetism of intercollegiate sports competition has been 
analogized to “85,000 people gathered for a family reunion.”17 
While we agree with Davis’s claim that commercialized college 
sports operate in a fundamentally different way than the amateur 
sports ideal, we do not believe that big-time college sports are subject 
to the same economic forces as purely commercial enterprises like 
professional sports. Although Davis’s description is likely true on the 
revenue side,18 as athletic directors seek to maximize the commercial 
return on big-time sports,19 nonprofit universities do not distribute the 
profits generated by commercially successful football and men’s 
basketball programs to shareholders. Indeed, athletic directors are 
 
15 Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 13–14. 
16 Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of 
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 784 (2010). 
17 Id. 
18 DONNA M. DESROCHERS, DELTA COST PROJECT AT AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, 
ACADEMIC SPENDING VERSUS ATHLETIC SPENDING: WHO WINS? 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.deltacostproject.org/ (“Newly negotiated television contracts are expected to 
significantly boost athletic revenues for the top programs in coming years, creating even 
more disparity in college athletics. For the top five conferences (ACC, Big 10, Big 12, 
Pac-12, and SEC), current media contracts are expected to generate more than $1 billion 
per year, with average conference revenues ranging from $12 million to $20 million per 
school per year. College sports are big business, and these contracts exceed the annual 
media contracts for Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, and the National 
Basketball Association.”). 
19 For example, it is difficult to imagine how big-time football programs would have 
behaved any differently with regard to TV revenues if they were solely intending to 
maximize profits. Stephen F. Ross, Radical Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics: Antitrust 
and Public Policy Implications, 86 TULSA L. REV. 933, 965 (2012) [hereinafter Ross, 
Radical Reform]. 
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typically motivated to spend surplus revenues from football and 
men’s basketball programs on socially worthy causes, which often 
include a broad range of intercollegiate sports for elite athletes that do 
not generate sufficient revenues to pay their costs,20 and occasionally 
subsidies for university academic and educational programs.21 We 
suggest that the desire to continue and expand these expensive 
programs is the real motivation for engaging in anticompetitive 
practices that might be unlawful if engaged in by for-profit non-sports 
enterprises (e.g., agreeing to a cap on the value of scholarships 
student-athletes receive for their playing services). 
Today, America’s academic leaders face 
intense pressures to attract larger incoming classes of students with 
stronger academic credentials, increase political and cultural 
support of their institutions from the larger community, recruit and 
retain high quality faculty, enlarge fundraising for brick and mortar, 
expand endowment, and grow their academic programs. In an 
extremely competitive higher education market, academic leaders 
increasingly use intercollegiate sports as a catalyst and means to 
achieve these legitimate ends. This [seemingly] rational conduct is 
merely a facet of competition in a well-functioning democratic 
 
20 See Cork Gaines, Texas Longhorns: How the Richest School in College Sports Makes 
and Spends Its Millions, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com/texas-longhorns-how-the-richest-school-in-college-sports-makes-and-spends   
-its-millions-2013-9?op=1 (“It’s clear [that] the football and men’s basketball teams 
support the rest of the athletic department. Those two teams combine for approximately 
70% of the revenue but only 24% of the expenses.”). For example, Ohio State University’s 
athletic department declared $123,604,626 of total revenue for the reporting year from 
summer 2012 through summer 2013. Data for Ohio State University, Equity in Athletics 
Data Analysis Cutting Tool, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov 
/athletics/index.aspx (follow “Get data for one institution” hyperlink; then enter “Ohio 
State University” in the “Name of Institution” field and select “NCAA Division I-A” as 
the Sanctioning Body; then follow “Ohio State University” hyperlink; then follow 
“Revenue and Expenses”) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). Of the total, men’s basketball 
contributed $18,781,682 and the football team contributed $61,131,726 in revenue. Id. 
Ohio State offers its over 1000 athletes at least thirty-six varsity sports. Liz Young, 
Athletic Director Gene Smith Named Ohio State Vice President, Contract Extended to 
2020, THELANTERN.COM (Jan. 29, 2014), http://thelantern.com/2014/01/athletic-director   
-gene-smith-named-ohio-state-vice-president-contract-extended-2020/. 
21 See, e.g., Chris Cusack, New Fund to Funnel Athletics Revenue to Duke Libraries, 
THE CHRONICLE (May 25, 2011), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2011/05/26/new 
-fund-funnel-athletics-revenue-duke-libraries; Department of Athletics Increases Support 
to Main Library to $9 Million, OHIO STATE UNIV. (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.osu.edu 
/news/newsitem2089; UT Athletics Provides Financial Update, UNIV. TENN. (Aug. 27, 
2012), http://www.utsports.com/genrel/082712aab.html. 
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society that embodies the centuries-old American enterprising spirit 
of doing what is necessary to compete successfully.22 
On the other hand, some (including one of us) have expressed 
concern that, at least to some extent, the diversion of funds otherwise 
available for educational purposes to subsidize intercollegiate 
athletics is the result of special interest pressure by powerful alumni 
 
22 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 792. Sports economist Rodney Fort 
has characterized a university’s funding of its athletic department as a budget allocation to 
provide a service (e.g., entertainment, identity/loyalty, branding) that furthers broader 
institutional objectives (e.g., increased giving to general fund, more and better student 
applications, favorable legislative treatment, better faculty and administrators, value added 
to student-athletes). RODNEY FORT & JASON WINFREE, 15 SPORTS MYTHS AND WHY 
THEY’RE WRONG 22–40 (2013). Many universities have used intercollegiate athletics as a 
tool to achieve greater public recognition and prominence. See Jon Solomon, Alabama 
Reports $143.4 Million in Athletic Revenue, up 16% from a Year Earlier, AL.COM (Oct. 
22, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/10/alabama_reports_1434 
_million_i.html; Univ. of Alabama’s Stringent Standards on Possible Trademark 
Infringements Examined, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Nov. 19 2013), http://www.sportsbusiness 
daily.com/Daily/Issues/2013/11/19/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/Alabama.aspx. But see 
DESROCHERS, supra note 18, at 2–4 (stating that based on recent research, “evidence of 
the ancillary benefits of college sports is mixed” with increased student applications from 
university athletic success “primarily associated with success in football (winning 
championships in particular), and the bump generally lasts only a year or two”; also noting 
studies find “little connection” between university’s athletic success and alumni giving 
with any positive effects “more often relate[d] to football, rather than basketball, success 
and is usually limited to athletic rather than general university donations”). For example, 
Notre Dame’s reputation as an internationally renowned university developed in lockstep 
with its athletic success on the gridiron. Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 
793. During recent seasons when the University of Florida won multiple national 
basketball and football championships, its “fundraising increased by 38% to $183 
million—with only 50% of the increase directed to athletics. UF recently launched a new 
$1.5 billion university fundraising campaign, which undoubtedly will benefit from the 
national notoriety generated by its intercollegiate program.” Id. at 793–94 (citations 
omitted). The increasing “growth and visibility of the University of Connecticut . . . has 
been based on an intercollegiate basketball-centered strategy,” id. at 796, and the recent 
success of the Boise State University football program has conferred similar benefits. Id. at 
793. At the same time, the extent to which athletics has diverted university resources from 
their core mission has been widely criticized at a variety of institutions. Richard Vedder, 
The ‘Arms Race’ in College Sports, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 30, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://m 
.startribune.com/opinion/?id=238117351; see also Marybeth Gasman, Morris Brown 
College: Its Plight, and How it Can Be Saved, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:08 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/therootdc/post/morris-brown-college-its-plight-and 
-how-it-can-be-saved/2012/08/29/071e3cc4-f1dc-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_blog.html; 
Kevin Kiley, Fighting too many Fires, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 3, 2013), http://www 
.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/03/rutgers-president-faces-controversy-multiple-fronts 
-including-athletics; Grant Wahl & George Dohrmann, Welcome to the Time Big Time, 
SI.COM (Nov. 19, 2001), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG102 
4363/index.htm. 
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and politicians who demand a level of “big-time sports” that their 
fellow sports fans will not support with their own dollars.23 
Part I of this Article discusses the tensions on a university’s 
educational mission and the adverse effects on student-athletes from 
the commercialization of big-time college sports, and the NCAA’s 
inability to effectively balance these conflicts consistent with its 
constitutional objectives. Part II observes that the professionalization 
of commercialized big-time college sports is not a solution that would 
further the public interest or student-athletes’ welfare. Part III asserts 
that the primary objectives of any reforms should be to ensure that 
student-athletes receive the educational benefits that are the hallmark 
of the NCAA’s self-professed line of demarcation between 
intercollegiate and professional sports. 
Parts IV and V explain why neither NCAA internal reforms nor 
external reforms imposed by antitrust law, respectively, will solve 
these problems. Part VI recommends new federal legislation to 
effectively maintain the socially worthy benefits of the 
commercial/educational model of intercollegiate athletics for student-
athletes and consumers. A key component of this law would be the 
establishment of an independent federal regulatory commission, 
which would provide an inclusive and transparent rule-making 
process readily accessible to all intercollegiate athletics stakeholders 
and the public. To ensure that its rules have a reasonable basis, we 
propose independent review through arbitration. Although the 
commission’s rules would not be legal mandates, their voluntary 
adoption by the NCAA and its member institutions would immunize 
anticompetitive restraints in connection with big-time college sports 
from judicial scrutiny under federal and state antitrust laws. 
We conclude by asserting that the prospect of antitrust immunity 
should provide the NCAA and its member institutions with a 
significant incentive to voluntarily adopt and comply with the 
commission’s rules, which would enable the NCAA to fulfill its 
 
23 Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 940–41; ASS’N OF GOVERNING BDS. OF 
UNIVS. & COLLS., TRUST, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INTEGRITY: BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 2 (2012), available at http://agb.org/sites/agb.org 
/files/KnightReport.pdf (“Although public and independent colleges, universities, and 
systems have their own governing boards and enjoy relative autonomy, they seem much 
less independent when it comes to intercollegiate sports. Powerful interests that benefit 
financially from big-time sports, as well as fans and booster clubs with emotional 
investments, can distort the clarity of mind required for effective governance.”). For a 
procedural proposal to limit special interest pressure, see text accompanying notes 130–39, 
infra. 
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constitutional objectives: (1) preserving the line between a 
commercial/education model and a commercial/professional model 
for intercollegiate sports; (2) enhancing the academic integrity of 
intercollegiate athletics; (3) promoting more competitive balance in 
big-time intercollegiate sports; and (4) requiring university athletic 
departments to operate with fiscal responsibility. 
I 
TENSIONS CAUSED BY COMMERCIALIZED BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS 
The use of intercollegiate sports by university leaders as part of 
their efforts to enable their respective institutions to flourish in an 
increasingly competitive higher education environment is a rational 
response to marketplace realities. However, this effort to 
commercially exploit the entertainment value of big-time football and 
men’s basketball has created an inherent tension with other goals that 
university leaders are urged to pursue.24 First, the competition for 
scarce resources between athletic programs and academic programs 
has the potential to distort the university’s core functions of teaching 
and research.25 A January 2013 analysis of universities’ academic and 
 
24 See JOHN CUMMINS & KIRSTEN HEXTRUM, THE MANAGEMENT OF 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT UC BERKELEY: TURNING POINTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
6 (2013), available at http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/management-intercollegiate     
-athletics-uc-berkeley-turning-points-and-consequences (“With all the controversy and 
conflict surrounding college sports, why do athletic departments continue to enjoy such a 
privileged yet problematic position in the academy? While college presidents cite the 
camaraderie sports bring to the campus, and the NCAA points to the educational 
experience offered to student athletes, many scholars and social critics rightly point to one 
reason: the money, or put more accurately, the potential to earn millions of dollars for the 
university, a potential rarely realized. It is within this highly commercialized context that 
administrators, coaches, campus leaders and alumni ultimately place undue pressure on 
student athletes to perform athletically at the expense of their academic work.”).  
25 See RAWLINGS PANEL ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter RAWLINGS PANEL], 
available at http://www.ecs.org/html/Document.asp?chouseid=10885. A panel of experts 
asked to report to the Chancellor of the University of North Carolina found the following 
premise necessary for their recommendations: 
Institutions of higher learning exist primarily to discover and to disseminate 
knowledge; winning sporting events is peripheral to those basic missions. As a 
result, a university’s athletics program must fit within the context of its core 
missions, and in no way violate them. Herein lies the principal challenge of 
intercollegiate athletics, since an institution’s desire to win must always be 
balanced against the core interests of the institution as a whole. Maintain the 
integrity of the fundamental missions, and the model works. Fail to maintain 
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athletic spending by the Delta Cost Project at the American Institutes 
for Research concluded: 
The difference between academic and athletic spending among 
Division I colleges and universities is striking. Each of the three 
subdivisions spent similarly on academics, ranging from roughly 
$11,800 to $13,600 per [full time equivalent] student in 2010 . . . . 
But among [the 120 big-time football programs], the median 
athletic expenditure per athlete was about $92,000, more than six 
times the per-student academic expense. Across the [Division I big-
time football programs and non-football] institutions, per-capita 
spending was three times higher on athletics as on academics, with 
athletic spending per athlete upwards of $36,000 in each [Division 
I] subdivision.26 
Despite the multibillion dollar revenues collectively generated by 
big-time football and men’s basketball programs,27 under certain 
accounting conventions relatively few Division I athletic departments 
(no more than approximately twenty to twenty-five each year) have 
revenues that equal or exceed their respective costs of producing 
intercollegiate athletics.28 As a result, university subsidies to Division 
I athletic departments are common and may be the norm at many 
institutions.29 Even if athletic departments are economically self-
 
integrity and the potential exists for the model to fail, and to cause serious 
damage to the institution. 
Id. Although we largely agree with the panel’s articulated premise, their restatement of the 
primary purpose of higher education seems to shortchange the experiential aspect of 
knowledge dissemination to students. Indeed, accepting this statement might well lead to a 
conclusion that big-time sports have no place in higher education. If one believes, as we 
do, that winning sporting events provides important life lessons to the participating 
student-athletes, creates social cohesion that facilitates learning and professional 
advancement for students and alumni, as well as revenue sources that can be tapped to 
directly subsidize a university’s core mission, then a more accurate statement is to describe 
winning sporting events as potentially complementary to, rather than peripheral to, the 
university’s basic objectives. 
26 DESROCHERS, supra note 18, at 4. 
27 In fiscal year 2010, Division I athletic programs generated $6 billion in revenues. Id. 
at 1. 
28 DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004–2012 NCAA DIVISION I 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 8, 13 (2013), available at http://www 
.ncaapublications.com/p-4306-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2012-ncaa-division-i-inter 
collegiate-athletics-programs-report.aspx. 
29 Studies finding that big-time college athletics is not financially self-sufficient depend 
on several critical accounting assumptions, because universities are not required to follow 
any generally accepted accounting principles. Universities typically receive an internal 
fund transfer from the athletics program to cover the “cost” of athletic scholarship, 
although the marginal cost to major universities of educating student-athletes is a fraction 
of that amount, and most institutions would not replace these student-athletes with tuition-
paying non-athletes if athletic scholarships disappeared. If this fund transfer were 
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sufficient, there is no self-evident policy reason that football and 
men’s basketball surpluses should necessarily be spent on non-
revenue Division I sports as opposed to other university programs. 
Second, commercialization of big-time sports has the potential to 
overshadow or marginalize the educational aspects of intercollegiate 
athletics, particularly for athletes of color who constitute the majority 
of athletes playing Division I men’s basketball (58%) and football 
(46.5%) during the 2012–13 season,30 thereby blurring the “clear line 
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”31 According to the NCAA’s Graduation Success Rate (GSR), 
eighty-two percent of Division I student-athletes who entered college 
for the first time in 2006 graduated within six years.32 However, the 
percentages of men’s basketball players (73%) and football players 
(71%) who graduated were lower.33 These sports historically have 
 
discounted, many “money losing” athletic departments would see their balance sheets turn 
from red to black. On the other hand, many universities do not “charge” the athletic 
department for the actual cost of university facilities, which may mean that some “self-
sufficient” athletic programs really are not. For a preliminary discussion of these issues, 
see Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 947. 
30 Race and Gender Demographics Search, NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd 
Search/exec/saSearch (select academic year “2012-2013,” “Division I,” and “Basketball” 
or “Football”; then follow “View Report”) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
31 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1. 
32 Allie Grasgreen, Athletes Grad Rates Back Up, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/10/25/after-slight-dip-athletes-graduation-rates 
-back. 
33 Id. This phenomenon exists even at some of America’s most academically elite 
universities. A recent analysis of the graduation rates of student-athletes who entered the 
University of California-Berkeley from 1998–2005 concluded:  
The graduation rate for UC Berkeley’s revenue generating teams are the lowest 
in the department. Men’s basketball went four years with none of their 
scholarship student athletes graduating. This brought down their average to a 
58% graduation rate over this eight year period. Football also has sub-par 
graduation rates. Over the past eight years, football graduation rates have ranged 
from a high of 72% to a low of 31%. Football has the lowest average team 
graduation rate with only 50% of their scholarship athletes graduating. The 
numbers are even more grim when broken down by race. In particular, the black 
scholarship football players, many of whom are special admits, have gone from a 
high of 80% to a low of 18%. The NCAA also tracks graduation rates by 
compiling four-year averages to even-out any anomalies. In this data set, the 
black graduation rates range from a high of 63% to a low of 30%. Three of the 
seven four-year averages mark the black graduation rate in the 30s. . . . On the 
whole, the student athlete graduation rates are commendable. These students face 
additional pressures, time commitments, and schedule conflicts that are in many 
ways unique to the student athlete subculture. Yet when the graduation rates are 
disaggregated by race, gender, and sport, a different picture emerges, particularly 
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had the lowest graduation rates for all NCAA sports, and 2013 was 
the first year in which both sports had a graduation rate of more than 
seventy percent.34 Moreover, the graduation rates for black basketball 
players (68%) and black football players (64%) were even lower.35 
Third, in light of contemporary economic realities—including the 
NCAA’s $11 billion men’s basketball tournament television 
contract,36 the more than $100 million in annual revenues raised by 
several athletic departments,37 and coaches’ multimillion dollar 
salaries38—the current structure results in significant economic 
exploitation of elite Division I football and men’s basketball players, 
without whose efforts these revenues would not be possible. 
Moreover, schools have increased expenditures on facilities and 
training for athletes designed to enhance their potential for winning 
games now and for a professional career later, while insisting on time 
 
for black male revenue athletes. These abysmal retention rates for black male 
revenue athletes illustrate that the most visible students of the athletic department 
are failing to earn a degree from UC Berkeley. 
Cummins & Hextrum, supra note 24, at 20. 
34 Grasgreen, supra note 32. After a recent scandal involving fake classes, members of 
the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill staff have admitted to loosening academic 
standards for athletes. Sara Ganim, UNC: We Failed Students ‘For Years,’ CNN (Jan. 29, 
2014, 1:36 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/28/us/ncaa-athletes-unc/index.html?hpt 
=us_c2. 
35 Grasgreen, supra note 32. 
36 Richard Sandomir & Pete Thamel, TV Deal Pushes N.C.A.A. Closer to 68-Team 
Tournament, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/sports/ncaa 
basketball/23ncaa.html?_r=0. 
37 See College: Finances, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college 
/schools/finances/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
38 College: Salaries, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014). A brief word here is in order to respond to those who advocate 
an antitrust immunity to permit NCAA schools to limit salaries for coaches. See Brad 
Wolverton, Watchdog Group’s Proposal Calls for Antitrust Exemption for NCAA, 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 11, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players 
/watchdog-groups-proposal-calls-for-antitrust-exemption-for-ncaa/33711. We see no 
public policy justification for asking successful college coaches to disproportionately 
shoulder the burden of funding socially worthy causes such as non-revenue sports or a 
university’s teaching and research programs. The University of Alabama’s multimillion 
dollar investment in Nick Saban’s salary, College: Salaries, supra, seems to us to be just 
as prudent as the University of Michigan’s multimillion dollar investment in expanding 
Michigan Stadium. See Adam Jacobi, Michigan AD: 120,000-Seat Stadium a Possibility, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (May 26, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry 
/24156338/29601474. To be sure, for a university to spend excessively to hire or retain a 
coach where funding is not being generated by the coaches’ own team raises different 
policy questions. But we see no basis to distinguish a university’s imprudent expenditure 
on a football coach from a university’s imprudent decision to operate multiple sports at the 
Division I level. 
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commitments analogous to full-time employment as a condition of an 
athletic scholarship.39 These demands make it difficult to sustain the 
claim that athletes playing for nationally-prominent programs do so 
primarily for the intrinsic benefits of athletics participation.40 
Fourth, even if a significant majority of big-time football and 
basketball players are not economically exploited—because the 
educational opportunities provided by an athletic scholarship along 
with an intercollegiate platform for developing their playing skills 
into a potential professional sports career is a fair trade for their 
services—many believe that the current system, with its 
comparatively lower graduation rates for these athletes, results in a 
socially undesirable exploitation of athletes.41 These athletes ought to 
receive education and training for academic success, as they are 
statistically much more likely to turn pro in something other than 
sports.42 
For a variety of reasons (structural ones are discussed below in Part 
V), the NCAA has neither effectively nor fairly accommodated these 
tensions as big-time athletics have become increasingly 
commercialized. This trend has led to an “arms race” of expenditures: 
(1) the top schools capable of earning nine-figure revenues spend 
millions on coaches, facilities, recruiting, and a variety of other things 
to maintain status in football and basketball; (2) other schools 
increase expenditures, even without the surpluses generated by the 
biggest programs, to try to keep up; (3) athletic directors with the 
professional and ideological incentive to promote broad-based 
intercollegiate programs use increased profits to subsidize or provide 
larger budgets for non-revenue sports; (4) non-revenue sport 
programs adopt the competitive mind-sets of big-time football and 
men’s basketball programs in terms of demands to win and 
 
39 Although 1991 NCAA legislation prohibits universities from requiring student-
athletes to spend more than twenty hours a week in connection with their respective sports, 
a 2010 survey found that Division I football and men’s basketball players reported 
spending substantially more time on required and voluntary sport-related activities (43.3 
and 39 hours a week respectively), which is more time than they spent on academic 
endeavors. RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 14. 
40 Id. 
41 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 7, at 243. 
42 Only 1.2% of NCAA men’s basketball players and 0.9% of NCAA football players 
go on to play professionally. Probability of Competing Beyond High School, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school 
(last updated Sept. 2013). 
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impositions on the time commitments for student-athletes;43 and (5) 
few universities seriously consider whether funds invested in 
intercollegiate athletics would be better spent on teaching and 
research or other aspects of its respective academic missions. The 
NCAA has neither determined that these multimillion dollar 
expenditures meet its own constitutional goal of prudent investment44 
in intercollegiate athletics, nor has it taken any steps to correct this 
development. Indeed, the NCAA has no detailed regulations 
enforcing this constitutional principle.45 
Despite the multibillion dollar revenues generated annually by big-
time sports, the economic value of the permissible benefits provided 
to big-time football and men’s basketball players remains capped at a 
level several thousand dollars below the actual full cost of 
attendance.46 Increased sport-related time demands preclude any 
meaningful ability for poor student-athletes to seek part-time 
employment to enable them to have access to the funds available to 
most of their nonathlete classmates.47 Superstar athletes who 
nevertheless comply with NCAA prohibitions against the receipt of 
“extra benefit[s]”48 despite receiving no or little family financial 
support, experience a lifestyle far below that of most of their 
classmates and almost all the fans who are entertained by their 
athletic performance. Absent NCAA rules restricting their ability to 
receive any economic benefits other than the value of a full athletic 
scholarship (i.e., tuition, fees, room, board, and books), these athletes 
likely would earn substantial economic rewards based on their 
 
43 This may occur even at America’s most academically elite universities. Cummins & 
Hextrum, supra note 24, at 2 (observing that UC Berkeley’s twenty-seven varsity sports 
other than football and men’s basketball “are also vulnerable to the current commercial 
pressures in college sports. For example, the Pac-12 television network will now offer 
coverage of Olympic sports”). 
44 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.16. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. §§ 2.13, 15, 15.1.1 (excepting Pell Grants from the total financial aid allowed for 
athletes); Federal Pell Grants, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid 
.ed.gov/types/grants-scholarships/pell (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (“The maximum Federal 
Pell Grant award is $5,645 for the 2013–14 award year . . . .”); Tyson Hartnett, Why 
College Athletes Should Be Paid, HUFF POST (Oct. 21, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/tyson-hartnett/college-athletes-should-be-paid_b_4133847.html; 
Jason Kirk, No, College Football Players Aren’t Unionizing for Pay-for-Play, SB NATION 
(Jan. 28, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/1/28/5354718 
/college-football-players-union-pay-for-play. 
47 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.4. 
48 Id. § 16.11.2.2. 
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intercollegiate athletics accomplishments and fame.49 However, 
college athletes currently cannot unionize and engage in 
multiemployer collective bargaining on a national basis with all 
NCAA Division I universities producing “big-time” men’s basketball 
and football for more favorable contract terms, despite a recent 
determination by the Chicago regional office of the National Labor 
Relations Board that Northwestern University scholarship football 
players are university employees.50 Moreover, courts generally will 
not imply additional, more favorable terms despite this disparity of 
bargaining power.51 
Throughout society, and particularly among those who consume 
and set policy for intercollegiate sports, there is a widely accepted 
view that the public interest is furthered by a system in which college 
football and basketball players are student-athletes who are expected 
to strive for excellence in both academics and athletics, unlike 
professional athletes whose sole focus is on the latter objective. As 
former Ohio State football coach Woody Hayes said: 
The coach will squeeze every bit of football from each player that 
he can, but in return the coach must give that man every legitimate 
measure of help he needs to get ‘the rest’ of his education. . . . we 
feel that the man who plays college football and does not graduate 
has been cheated.52 
Based on NCAA graduation rates for Division I men’s basketball 
(73%) and FBS football players (71%), more than one-quarter of 
 
49 Players like Johnny “Football” Manziel are incredibly marketable. One endorsement 
company believes a single tweet would earn Manziel nearly $3500. Kavitha A. Davidson, 
Johnny Football Is More Gronk Than Brady, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-09/johnny-football-is-more-gronk-than-brady 
.html. Upon being drafted by the Broncos, NCAA sensation Tim Tebow realized his 
endorsement value was worth tens of millions of dollars. Tim Tebow Says He Has Turned 
down ‘Seven-Figure’ Endorsement Deals, HUFF POST (May 3, 2010, 8:17 PM, updated 
May 25, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/tim-tebow-says-he   
-has-tur_n_575761.html. 
50  Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association, 13-RC-121359 
(N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.espn.go.com/pdf/2014 
/0326/espn_uniondecision.PDF. The National Labor Relations Act applies only to private 
employers (e.g., Northwestern, a private university), not the public universities (e.g., The 
Ohio State University) that constitute the vast majority of the NCAA’s 351 Division I 
members. List of NCAA Division I Institutions, WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/List_of _NCAA_Division_I_institutions (last updated Mar. 31, 2014, 3:37 PM). 
51 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake 
Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991). 
52 W. WOODROW HAYES, YOU WIN WITH PEOPLE! 12 (1973). 
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them do not graduate within six years of entering college.53 
Approximately one-third of black basketball and football players 
(32% and 36% respectively) do not earn a degree within this time 
frame.54 Thus, these student-athletes are being cheated under the view 
espoused by former coach Hayes.55 Although NCAA regulations 
requiring student-athletes to make genuine academic progress towards 
a degree56 and denying postseason eligibility to schools with 
unacceptably low graduation rates in a sport57 address past systemic 
abuses and attempt to maintain the academic integrity of 
intercollegiate athletics (particularly big-time sports), significant 
problems remain. In particular, the current system of commercialized 
big-time sports fails to acknowledge, much less to effectively address, 
that both universities and student-athletes (many of whom are 
teenagers) have an incentive to focus unduly on short-term goals, 
such as a winning season or a future professional career, instead of 
the long-term benefits of earning a college degree. 
  
 
53 Grasgreen, supra note 32. 
54 Id. 
55 In chapter 6 of his Ph.D. dissertation, which is titled “The Role of Education in 
Pursuing the Dream of a Professional Football Career,” former NFL player George 
Koonce, writes: 
The [former college football] players interviewed in this study had high 
expectations regarding their identities as college students but were surprised to 
find they were not taken seriously as students or young scholars. They were often 
let off the hook when it came to participation in classes; thus, they began to feel 
that little was expected of them when it came to school. They were merely 
athletes. Though they were told to go to classes and to participate in study halls, 
they began to understand that they were being made to feel secure about their 
academic behaviors and achievements when perhaps they should not have felt so. 
The coaching staff determined their schedules, and then, exhausted by practices, 
the athletes could not truly keep up with their schoolwork. They found 
themselves going from feeling optimistic to being overwhelmed when it came to 
school. They noticed that other athletes around them were not motivated when it 
came to school and eventually, they too disengaged from academics. 
George Earl Koonce, Jr., Role Transition of National Football League Retired Athletes: A 
Grounded Theory Approach 105–06 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Marquette University) (on file with author). 
56 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
57 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.02.1; Adam Himmelsbach, UCONN is Among 
Those Barred from Postseason Basketball, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/06/21/sports/ncaabasketball/uconn-basketball-is-among-those-to-receive-post 
season-ban.html?_r=0. 
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II 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF COMMERCIALIZED COLLEGE SPORTS IS 
NOT THE SOLUTION 
The appropriate response to the multibillion dollar 
commercialization of big-time football and men’s basketball is not 
professionalization of those who participate in these sports. North 
American professional sports operate on a purely 
commercial/professional model, with dominant sports leagues 
controlled by individual clubs owned by investors seeking to 
maximize their profits.58 Although, like these sports, big-time college 
football and basketball are enormously popular forms of 
entertainment with very substantial commercial value, they should not 
be based on the commercial profit-maximizing model characteristic of 
professional sports. 
First, even from a purely commercial perspective, it is unclear 
whether any institutions would benefit from operating a professional 
model. The quality of play in college football and men’s basketball is 
far below that of the National Football League and National 
Basketball Association, and is more akin to a far less commercially 
successful professional sport, such as minor league baseball.59 Absent 
clear product differentiation from professional sports, college sports 
might lose a significant portion of their audience. Moreover, output 
might be substantially reduced if the many schools currently offering 
big-time football were required to fully compete in a labor market for 
the services of talented intercollegiate players. 
Second, adoption of the professional model would create numerous 
legal issues for schools, such as tax liability,60 labor,61 and workers’ 
 
58 This is in model contrast to the European model of sport, where professional sports 
leagues are often composed of and operated by “win maximizing” clubs, Stefan Kesenne, 
Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports, 1 J. SPORTS 
ECON. 56 (2000), and all sports are under an integrated pyramid subject to regulation by a 
national governing board as part of an international federation. See generally James A.R. 
Nafziger, European and North American Models of Sports Organization, in HANDBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 88–111 (James A.R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds., 
2011). 
59 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. (Board of 
Regents), 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984). 
60 See generally John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109. 
61 See generally Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market: 
College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077. 
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compensation.62 These legal issues do not arise if intercollegiate 
athletics is operated as an integral part of the university’s educational 
program. 
The demands of big-time football and men’s basketball 
(particularly in-season) require significantly more time than an 
avocation, and virtually all participants receive an athletic scholarship 
(a form of pay for play) that negates any true “amateur” status.63 
Nevertheless, students’ participation in intercollegiate athletics should 
not be motivated solely or primarily by economic rewards as is the 
case with professional athletes. If elite young athletes are going to 
participate in a professional sports competition, public policy 
certainly does not dictate that competitions be organized by major 
universities rather than professional enterprises. In contrast, there is a 
public policy justification for preferring the intercollegiate athletics 
model to the minor league professional sports model. College sports 
provide a large number of athletes, who recognize that the probability 
of a successful future professional sports career is low, with the 
opportunity to leverage their athletic abilities into academic 
achievement that might otherwise be unavailable to them. 
To be sure, some athletically-gifted young men may participate in 
big-time football or men’s basketball solely as a platform to enhance 
their future professional playing prospects, exhibiting a short-sighted 
disregard for the objective reality that the probability of a successful 
professional sports career is low.64 Ideally, these athletes would have 
the option of pursuing a professional career immediately,65 or 
selecting a mixed-model of intercollegiate athletes (neither strictly 
amateur66 nor fully professional) in which they can develop 
 
62 See generally Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Beckham, Workers’ Compensation and 
Collegiate Athletes: The Debate over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint, 31 J.L. & 
EDUC. 293 (2002). 
63 See generally Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) 
(holding that the NCAA academic requirements constituted the only standard for 
measuring academic success and a student who refused to participate in practice to 
improve academic performance violated his contractual obligation to the University and 
lost his scholarship). 
64 Probability of Competing Beyond High School, supra note 42. 
65 Clearly, elite baseball and hockey players can choose between developing their skills 
through minor league professional sports and intercollegiate athletics. Increasingly, 
basketball players can make the same choice, either through the NBA’s Development 
League, Frequently Asked Questions, NBA DEV. LEAGUE, https://dleaguetryouts.nba.com 
/FAQs.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2014), or by playing professionally overseas. 
66 Richard T. Karcher, The Battle Outside of the Courtroom: Principles of 
“Amateurism” vs. Principles of Supply and Demand, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2 
(forthcoming 2014) (“In essence, ‘amateurism’ is nothing more than a term designating a 
MITTEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  12:17 PM 
2014] A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values 855 
and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics 
athletically as well as educationally. When there is no alternative 
option, as is currently the case with NFL football,67 society must 
choose whether to organize big-time college football under the 
commercial/educational model or the commercial/professional model. 
Selecting the former because it promotes wider educational access for 
many seems justified, even at the risk of making some paternalistic 
choices for those who prefer not to take advantage of educational 
opportunities that are mandated by the model. 
III 
A BETTER ALTERNATIVE: ENSURING STUDENT-ATHLETES IN 
COMMERCIALIZED SPORTS ACTUALLY RECEIVE THE BENEFITS THAT 
DISTINGUISH INTERCOLLEGIATE AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
Intercollegiate football and men’s basketball players generally 
devote more time to their sports and have lower graduation rates than 
other intercollegiate athletes.68 We believe a preferred policy 
alternative is to ensure that these student-athletes receive the 
educational, physical, mental, and social benefits that schools ought to 
provide them, in return for their commercially successful participation 
in commercialized intercollegiate athletics. This approach is more 
consistent with the economic and social benefits of retaining 
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of a university’s 
educational program. These benefits are likely to be more 
economically beneficial to student-athletes in the long term than 
compensating them with cash for their playing services (like 
professional athletes), as a free-market antitrust-driven approach may 
require.69 
 
business model. ‘Principles of amateurism’ mean whatever the NCAA says they mean, 
and they apply whenever the NCAA says they apply.”). 
67 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
NFL’s rule requiring a player to be three years removed from high school before becoming 
draft eligible does not violate antitrust law and adding that the union can create standards 
for its members). 
68 See RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 12. 
69 Empirical studies have found that former male intercollegiate athletes earn higher 
annual incomes on average than otherwise similar nonathletes in non-sports careers. 
Daniel J. Henderson, Alexandre Olbrecht & Solomon W. Polachek, Do Former College 
Athletes Earn More at Work?, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 558 (2006); James E. Long & 
Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and 
Graduation, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 525 (1991). 
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Although NCAA academic reforms70 have minimized egregious 
examples of exploitation of individual student-athletes such as Dexter 
Manley71 and Kevin Ross,72 the prevailing commercialized model of 
big-time sports remains inconsistent with the fundamental NCAA 
principle that athletes “should be protected from exploitation by . . . 
commercial enterprises.”73 We parse the NCAA’s governing 
principles to acknowledge the fundamental economic reality that 
major universities are themselves “commercial enterprises” when 
promoting football and men’s basketball.74 If we consider why a 
university would expect a student-athlete to forego part-time 
employment and commit forty or more hours per week in-season to 
intercollegiate athletics, certainly one answer is the commercial 
benefit to the university from offering big-time sports. Many student-
athletes are so multi-talented that they can excel at all aspects of 
college life.75 However, some student-athletes struggling 
 
70 See supra notes 56–57. 
71 Dexter Manley, a former NFL football player, admitted that he never learned to read 
despite spending four years in college while playing football for Oklahoma State 
University. Dexter Manley, Until He Tackled His Illiteracy, the Redskins’ Gridiron Terror 
Lived in Fear of the ABC’s, PEOPLE (Sept. 25, 1989, 1:00 AM), http://www.people.com 
/people/article/0,,20121269,00.html. 
72 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Ross 
earned a D average in his classes and attended a year of remedial education with grade 
school children before he could no longer afford additional education). 
73 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.9. 
74 Under an alternative parsing of the NCAA principle, even if universities are per se 
excluded from the description of “commercial enterprises,” a university that promotes a 
level of commercialism so that it can receive revenue from corporate sponsors or 
television rights sales is failing to protect student-athletes from exploitation from these 
organizations. 
75 See, e.g., Campbell Trophy Winner Urschel to be Honored at BCS National 
Championship, PENN STATE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://news.psu.edu/story/299261/2014/01/06 
/academics/campbell-trophy-winner-urschel-be-honored-bcs-national. John Urschel, a 
two-time All-Big Ten offensive lineman and 2013 Third Team All-American football 
player at Penn State, received the Campbell Trophy awarded to the outstanding scholar-
athlete for combining his on-field success with academic excellence including serving as 
an instructor during football season for his senior year (he had already graduated) and 
securing publication of an article in Celestial Mechanics and Dynamic Astronomy and 
another paper in the journal Communications in Mathematical Finance. Id. As another 
example, in 2014, Ohio State senior guard Aaron Craft, who holds the Big Ten career 
record for steals, was selected as the Defensive Player of the Year by the National 
Association of Basketball Coaches and honored as the Capital One Academic All-America 
of the Year for Division I men's basketball. Ari Wasserman, Aaron Craft Named the 
Defensive Player of the Year by the National Association of Basketball Coaches, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 4, 2014, 6:14 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf 
/2014/04/aaron_craft_named_the_defensiv.html; Doug Lesmerises, Ohio State's Aaron 
Craft Named College Basketball's Academic All-America of the Year, CLEVELAND.COM 
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academically would likely focus on short-term professional success 
by foregoing the benefits of a college degree for some marginal 
improvement on the gridiron or court. Thus, colleges and universities 
that insist upon such a commitment can be fairly characterized as 
exploiting these athletes in order to advance their own commercial 
interests. 
Public policy suggests, then, that reform proposals acknowledge 
that long-term interests are not served by the short-term “bargain” 
between ostensibly “student-athletes” focused primarily on their 
professional careers and college athletic programs that value their 
services. Rather, as we detail in Part VI, a better alternative is reform 
that creates programs designed to ensure that student-athletes 
participating in big-time sports receive the fullest opportunity to gain 
the benefits that a college education can offer. 
IV 
NCAA INTERNAL REFORM—BY ITS ECONOMICALLY SELF-
INTERESTED MEMBER UNIVERSITIES—WILL NOT EFFECTIVELY 
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM 
One of us has previously detailed the inherent structural problems 
when economically self-interested members govern a dominant 
professional sporting competition and make the rules governing the 
sport. These members may adopt rules for the best interest of the 
competition as a whole, but may use their power over economic 
relationships between themselves and with third parties to further 
their own narrow, parochial self-interest.76 These problems are 
exacerbated in the case of the NCAA, an organization with 
monolithic power to govern big-time intercollegiate sports, which 
must not only balance the varied economic goals of its more than 
1000 members, but also pursue noneconomic values that justify the 
anticompetitive effects of its rules and governance decisions. As Tom 
McMillen, a former United States Representative and University of 
Maryland and NBA basketball star, observed, “[t]here is just too 
 
(Feb. 21, 2013, 5:29 PM) http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf/2013/02/ohio_states 
_aaron_craft_named_1.html. 
76 See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD 
UNITE! A (CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS (2008). 
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much money involved in the multibillion-dollar industry that is 
college athletics to expect the participants to police themselves.”77 
Consider the NCAA constitutional principle promoting competitive 
equity in athletics among member schools.78 As any fan of the 
University of California Golden Bears football team (its last Rose 
Bowl visit was 1959)79 can attest, the NCAA obviously does not 
promote strict parity among individual athletic conferences, much less 
among all Division I universities that compete in big-time football or 
men’s basketball. Indiana University’s president no doubt has a 
different view on the desirable extent of competitive equity in 
intercollegiate athletics (at least regarding football) than his Ohio 
State University counterpart. Even if NCAA Division I member 
universities could reach an agreement on competitive equity, it is 
unrealistic to expect them to appropriately resolve the conflict 
between this objective, which promotes fan interest in intercollegiate 
athletics, and the NCAA constitutional principle that student-athletes 
should not be exploited. This is especially apparent given that the five 
Division I power conferences advocate increasing the value of an 
athletic scholarships to the full cost of university attendance.80 Not 
surprisingly, other Division I member schools with fewer commercial 
opportunities overrode this proposed NCAA legislation, primarily 
based on economic concerns regarding the increased costs of 
providing competitive intercollegiate athletic programs.81 
Self-governing organizations also struggle to solve problems 
relating to wasteful expenditures. For example, in all likelihood the 
University of Oregon would have vigorously opposed rules barring its 
new training and locker facilities,82 while Ohio State University 
 
77 C. Thomas McMillen, Accountability on the Quad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/opinion/how-to-referee-college-sports.html. 
78 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.10. 
79 Jeff Faraudo, New Cal Football Coach Sonny Dykes Talks Rose Bowl Goal, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_221 
40817/new-cal-coach-sonny-dykes-talks-rose-bowl. 
80 Andy Staples, Full-Cost-of-Attendance Scholarship Debate Could Break up the FBS, 
SI.COM (Mar. 8, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/andy 
_staples/03/08/presidents-scholarships/. 
81 Id. 
82 See Tom Ley, Oregon’s New “Football Performance Center” Is a Decadent 
Monstrosity, DEADSPIN.COM (July 31, 2013), http://deadspin.com/oregons-new-football             
-performance-center-is-a-decaden-975295515; Daniel Uthman, Stunning Amenities in 
Oregon’s New Football Facility, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013, 1:28 AM), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/08/01/outrageously-unique-amenities-in-oregons-new  
-football-facility-hatfield-dowlin-complex/2606223/. 
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would likely oppose limits on its use of private jets for recruiting.83 In 
contrast, observers give significant weight to NASCAR’s 
independence from the racing teams for that sport’s success in 
limiting automotive engineering expenditures that would result in vast 
costs with minimal benefit to consumers.84 Consistent with this view, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that limiting competition among 
retailers of a product is often anticompetitive when the limits are 
produced by agreement among the retailers, but often promotes 
competition when the limits are imposed on retailers pursuant to a 
policy adopted by a separate firm such as the manufacturer.85 
Like numerous other American voluntary membership 
associations, the NCAA is a private organization whose members 
have significant authority and freedom to make and enforce their own 
rules.86 However, unlike members of the Moose Lodge who can join 
another similar group such as the Elks if they are unhappy with its 
rules, those dissatisfied with NCAA regulations cannot simply quit 
and join another co-equal national body that governs intercollegiate 
athletics. This important principle was judicially recognized in 
England over half a century ago (before the United Kingdom enacted 
effective competition or employment discrimination laws), in a 
challenge to a regulation by another private organization—the Jockey 
Club—that barred female trainers.87 The eminent British jurist Lord 
Denning held that the common law needed to evolve to condemn the 
male-only regulation because there was a broader public interest 
when a sporting organization exercises dominance in the field.88 
Just as the Jockey Club of the “Mad Men” era excluded women, 
the NCAA, if free from external constraint, would continue to short-
change the long-term welfare of student-athletes. The most recent 
controversy, where modest additional benefits (a small stipend for 
 
83 See Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 953–54. 
84 ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE NASCAR WAY: THE BUSINESS THAT DRIVES THE 
SPORT 35–37 (1998). 
85 Compare United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 130 (1966) 
(agreement by retail car dealers to pressure General Motors to cease supply to discount 
rival was unlawful), with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56–58 
(1977) (television manufacturer’s policy limiting number of authorized retailers in major 
markets was lawful unless evidence demonstrably showed harmful effects). 
86 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) 
(describing the NCAA). 
87 See Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 (Eng.). 
88 Id. 
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spending money and other expenses that many universities include in 
nonathletic aid in determining the full cost of an education) were 
rejected, largely because of the parochial self-interest of some 
member schools (who did not want to bear the additional cost), 
demonstrates that the NCAA structure inhibits policies that redress 
student-athlete exploitation. In addition, the NCAA’s track record 
with regard to the interests of other stakeholders establishes a clear 
and predictable pattern: reforms that address public interest concerns 
take a back seat to the status quo when a significant number of 
member schools’ economic interests would be adversely affected.89 
Because the NCAA is a private organization, the NCAA has no duty 
to articulate precisely why it has balanced its conflicting goals in the 
manner it has chosen. 
If there is a public interest in maintaining big-time intercollegiate 
athletics, by ensuring that the commercialized aspects of the sport 
coexist with noncommercial aspects that provide educational benefits 
to participating student-athletes, as well as economic and cultural 
benefits to the rest of the university community, reform must come 
from a source external to the NCAA.90 To date, the NCAA’s critics 
have sought reform through innovative attempts to use contract law to 
challenge perceived unfairness in NCAA rules91 and by launching 
 
89 For example, prior to the external restraint of an antitrust judgment in Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 135–36 (1984), the NCAA exploited consumers by limiting access 
to football games; after the judgment, the number of games tripled in one year. PAUL C. 
WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 888 (4th ed. 2011). 
Likewise, without regard for any coherent justification based on its unique role in 
managing college athletics, the NCAA exploited college assistant coaches by limiting their 
salaries. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1013–15 (10th Cir. 1998). 
90 Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting 
the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 246 (2014) (advocating that any 
NCAA antitrust immunity should be “subject to independent regulatory oversight” to 
ensure that “the NCAA would not be able to act solely in its own economic interest,” but 
concluding that “it is difficult to articulate just what agency or oversight body would be 
capable of taking on the enormous task”). We agree with the need for independent 
regulatory oversight as a condition of NCAA antitrust immunity, while proposing federal 
legislation that would establish a regulatory regime for furthering the legitimate objectives 
of the commercial/education model of big-time intercollegiate athletics. See infra Part VI. 
91 A number of state courts have creatively applied the contract law doctrine of third 
party beneficiaries to judicially review the particular application of an NCAA rule to an 
individual student or coach. This doctrine, especially where combined with the court’s 
refusal to enforce NCAA rules that violate public policy, can be effective in some limited 
contexts. See, e.g., Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. 
C.P. 2009) (refusing to enforce NCAA rule barring baseball player selected in a 
professional draft from consulting an attorney in the next room in evaluating whether to 
turn pro). However, another leading case indicates the limits of this doctrine. Bloom v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004) was a substantive 
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antitrust actions against specific NCAA policies.92 As we explain 
below, antitrust law appropriately requires commercial firms to 
compete with a principal focus on enhancing welfare for paying 
customers, while failing to meaningfully deal with ways in which 
non-commercial firms may act contrary to the public interest. Because 
our model for big-time college sports does not seek a purely 
commercial approach, antitrust challenges are a highly imprecise 
means of demanding reform. We discuss antitrust law and its limits in 
the following two Parts. 
V 
ALTHOUGH NCAA SCHOOLS HAVE MONOPSONY POWER IN THE 
MARKET FOR “BIG-TIME SPORTS PLAYING SERVICES,” ANTITRUST 
LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION THAT 
ACCOMMODATES THE PUBIC INTEREST IN CONTINUING UNIVERSITY 
PARTICIPATION IN COMMERCIALIZED INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 
One strategy for remedying the economic exploitation of student-
athletes by commercialized college sports programs has been to 
challenge NCAA regulations under the federal antitrust laws. For a 
variety of reasons, we believe that use of the Sherman Act93 is an ill-
fitting solution to these problems. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the Sherman Act was primarily designed to focus on for-profit 
 
challenge to NCAA regulations that permit student-athletes to retain eligibility in one sport 
whilst turning pro in another sport, but barring endorsement income. In this case, a 
member of the Colorado Buffalos football squad was a professional skier, barred from 
endorsing skis. Id. at 622. However, contract law theory did not allow him to prevail, 
because the “contract” itself—the NCAA rules—explicitly prohibited the income he 
sought to receive. Id. at 627. As these cases illustrate, contract law is ineffective in barring 
rules that are not really necessary to maintain the commercial/education model and 
worthless in mandating specific reforms to improve the model. 
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting challenge to rule barring players from playing as graduate students at a second 
university); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting challenge to rules barring players from signing with agents or submitting name 
for professional draft); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (rejecting challenge to suspension of Southern Methodist University football 
team for widespread cash payments to players); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, No. C 09-3329CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (rejecting pretrial 
efforts to dismiss challenge to NCAA rule requiring players to waive in perpetuity all 
publicity rights for performing for a university). See also Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678, (D.N.J., filed Mar. 17, 2014) (alleging the NCAA cap 
on economic value of athletic scholarships violates §1 of Sherman Act). 
93 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
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commercial enterprises and that antitrust analysis must account for 
the unusual contexts in which nonprofit entities engage in and 
potentially restrain trade.94 However, antitrust law is not well-suited 
for case-by-case judicial application to an industry characterized by 
pro- and anticompetitive trade restraints where a widely-accepted 
social goal is the use of monopoly profits for worthy causes. This is 
precisely the commercial/education model that describes big-time 
college sports.95 
In a 1984 case, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,96 a majority of the 
Supreme Court, having rejected the dissent’s contention that 
amateurism justified any commercial restraint by NCAA member 
schools, identified a procompetitive economic justification for a 
variety of NCAA regulations: product differentiation. The Court then 
proceeded to pronounce that “athletes must not be paid, must be 
required to attend class, and the like.”97 The Court provided no 
empirical support for the assertion that these rules were necessary to 
“preserve the character and quality of the ‘product.’”98 
Since then, lower courts have mimicked this approach by rejecting 
various challenges to rules justified by the NCAA as promoting 
amateurism and maintaining the clear line of demarcation from 
professional sports without any serious consideration as to if and how 
the precise rule in question actually served the product differentiation 
goal articulated by the Supreme Court. Under current antitrust law, 
courts have ruled that a broad range of NCAA rules designed to 
preserve amateurism are legal regardless of any adverse effects on 
student-athletes’ economic interests, including rules prohibiting any 
price competition among universities or payment of fair market wages 
for their athletic services or forbidding student-athletes to receive any 
athletics-related pecuniary benefits from nonfamily third parties.99 
 
94 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
95 For this reason, detailed in the text to follow, our proposal meets the standard for 
exemption recommended by the Antitrust Modernization Commission: “competition 
cannot achieve important societal goals that trump consumer welfare.” ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION viii (2007). 
96 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See, e.g., Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 
1983); see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 344–45 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“It is not until payment above and beyond educational costs is received that a 
player is considered a ‘paid athlete.’ . . . The NCAA’s limitation on athlete compensation 
beyond educational expenses . . . directly advances the goal of maintaining a ‘clear line of 
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One of us has previously observed that courts’ reliance upon the 
amateur/education model of intercollegiate athletics to summarily 
reject student-athletes’ antitrust challenges to NCAA amateurism 
eligibility rules is inconsistent with the current economic realities of 
big-time football and men’s basketball.100 Courts should recognize 
that the commercial/education model applies to big-time college 
football and men’s basketball. In a 2013 case, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (O’Bannon), a federal 
judge did so by rejecting the NCAA’s argument that all of its 
amateurism rules are per se legal as a matter of law, regardless of 
whether they have anticompetitive effects in a properly defined 
relevant market.101 A group of current and former football and men’s 
basketball student-athletes alleged that the NCAA violated federal 
antitrust law by conspiring with Electronic Arts and Collegiate 
Licensing Company (who previously settled their claims) to restrain 
competition in the market for the commercial use of their names, 
images, and likenesses “in game footage or in videogames.”102 The 
court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the athletes’ claims were 
“nothing more than a challenge to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism” 
and therefore must be dismissed under Board of Regents, which stated 
in dicta that “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the 
NCAA’s ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid.”103 
On the other hand, not all NCAA rules designed to maintain the 
amateur nature of intercollegiate sports, or more appropriately the 
unique brand of college sports, have the requisite anticompetitive 
effects necessary to subject them to antitrust scrutiny. As a threshold 
matter, although all amateurism regulations constitute input market 
restraints that are the product of an agreement among NCAA member 
universities, their respective anticompetitive effects, if any, must be 
identified. In other words, a particular NCAA amateurism rule 
potentially violates the Sherman Act only if it reduces economic 
competition among NCAA member schools for student-athletes’ 
services and harms consumer welfare. This may be a threshold that 
 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,’ and thus is best 
categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence of amateurism and the 
student-athlete.” (citations omitted)). 
100 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 829–37. 
101 No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5778233, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013). 
102 Id. at *2. 
103 Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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immunizes regulations that do not serve the public interest in a 
commercial/education model of intercollegiate athletics from antitrust 
scrutiny.104 
O’Bannon illustrates both current problems as well as the 
difficulties if antitrust law is used as the principal means of correcting 
commercial exploitation of student-athletes who participate in big-
time sports. The initial litigation was brought by Ed O’Bannon, a 
former UCLA basketball star.105 O’Bannon challenged an alleged 
agreement among NCAA schools that required student-athletes, as a 
condition of participating in intercollegiate athletics, to permanently 
waive any rights to publicity arising out of their intercollegiate 
athletic participation.106 He specifically complained that his likeness 
was being used by EA Sports in a video game, years after he had left 
UCLA and, indeed, even after he had retired from a successful career 
in professional basketball.107 
It is difficult to perceive a procompetitive economic justification 
for this restraint, especially if the damages sought by O’Bannon’s 
complaint were limited to royalties to be paid to former student-
athletes on a pro rata basis after they had completed their eligibility. 
Can anyone seriously claim that Pauley Pavilion (where UCLA plays 
its basketball games) will face empty seats, or that the Pac-12 
Network will face dwindling ratings, if fans know that the student-
athletes representing UCLA will, years down the road, receive video 
game royalties? 
These issues get a bit more difficult if we consider whether the 
clear line of demarcation between college and pro sports would be 
crossed or blurred by providing a trust fund for royalties for current 
players. To date, federal judges have not been willing to seriously 
consider the boundaries of this clear line of demarcation, which has 
been solely defined and established by the NCAA’s amateurism rules. 
 
104 Thus, the court of appeals in Banks v. National Collegiate Athletics Association, 977 
F.2d 1081, 1091–92 (7th Cir. 1992), found that the NCAA’s decision to operate sports on 
an amateur basis meant there was no relevant economic market where member schools 
competed against each other for the commercial athletic “services” of players. This 
allowed the court to dismiss an antitrust complaint without any examination of whether the 
regulations exploited student-athletes or genuinely served any noncommercial educational 
goals. Id. 
105 O’Bannon, at *1. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *2. 
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Instead, most courts have characterized such rules as virtually per se 
legal under antitrust law.108 
To the extent that the antitrust law theories raised in O’Bannon are 
applied to limits on player compensation paid by NCAA universities 
rather than third parties, such as EA Sports, the issues become even 
more complex. First, courts are likely, even on serious 
reconsideration, to reaffirm Justice Stevens’s observation in Board of 
Regents that product differentiation requires that intercollegiate 
athletes be full-time students.109 This means that the cost of an 
education is a condition of participation in big-time college sports. 
Second, if it is lawful for the NCAA to require student-athletes to 
be enrolled as full-time students at the colleges that they represent on 
the field or court, the next question is whether antitrust laws would 
allow the NCAA to regulate a university’s decision on what fees to 
charge the student-athlete for the education it mandates. In a model of 
competition that antitrust presumes, colleges will gladly pay for 
education for the top stars, and will indeed likely pay far in excess of 
the cost of education for the small handful of players whose skills are 
so superior to the likely alternative player that they are worth 
significant sums.110 However, for many and probably most student-
athletes, their “Value Over Replacement” (VORP) is not likely to be 
very high, especially entering college from high school.111 Given the 
existing legal barriers and other practical difficulties of unionizing 
 
108 See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.  
109 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984). 
110 For those unfamiliar with the world of sabermetrics, the concept is encapsulated in a 
baseball metric called “Value Over Replacement Player” or “VORP.” Value over 
Replacement Player–VORP, SPORTING CHARTS, http://www.sportingcharts.com 
/dictionary/mlb/value-over-replacement-player-vorp.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
111 In this regard, it is important to recognize that all major league professional athletes 
in the United States earn hefty salaries regardless of their value to their respective clubs, 
not because of the free market, but because the unions representing each league’s players 
have collectively negotiated such a high minimum salary. The minimum salary for an 
NHL player for the 2013–2014 season is $550,000. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
PLAYERS’ ASS’N, art. 11.12 (2012). The minimum MLB salary for the 2014 season is 
$500,000. 2012–2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, MLB & MLBPA, art. VI, § A (2012). In the 
NBA, the minimum salary is dependent upon years of service, the lowest possible salary 
during the 2013–14 season is $490,180 and can only be offered to a rookie. NBA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Exhibit C, C-1 (2011). For the 2014 season, the 
minimum NFL salary for an active player is $420,000. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT, NFL & NFL PLAYERS’ ASS’N, art. 26, § 1(a) (2011). 
MITTEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  12:17 PM 
866 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 837 
college athletes on a national basis,112 the likely effect of a purely 
antitrust remedy will be to correct the economic exploitation of a 
handful of star players participating in big-time intercollegiate sports 
at the expense of most other Division I football and men’s basketball 
players, whose economic value would not justify a full athletic 
scholarship.113 
Third, there is widespread support that society wants big-time 
college football and men’s basketball programs to create surplus 
funds that can be spent on socially worthy causes, such as broad-
based intercollegiate athletic programs for students skilled in non-
revenue generating sports and university academic programs. 
Antitrust law requires the NCAA to prove, as a matter of fact, that the 
anticompetitive effects of its amateurism rules––which are the 
product of an agreement among its collective member universities––
are justified as narrowly tailored to achieve procompetitive effects 
that lower price, increase output, or render output more responsive to 
consumer preferences.114 Examples of procompetitive justifications 
are preserving a different brand of athletic competition than 
professional sports or maintaining a level of competitive balance 
among its member institutions that fans prefer. Although NCAA 
amateurism rules artificially reduce universities’ “labor” costs of 
producing big-time football and men’s basketball programs by 
prohibiting any price competition for players’ services and institutions 
use these cost savings to fund socially desirable objectives, this is not 
 
112 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
113 Consider the antitrust litigation in professional football brought by members of a 
development squad whose skills were not sufficient to make the major league roster. Prior 
to the NFL owners’ adoption of a rule limiting salaries to $1000 per week, the plaintiffs 
received compensation ranging from $2187 to $6250 per week. Brown v. Pro Football, 
Inc., No. 90-1071, 1992 WL 88039, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992). Thus, many of the best 
professional football players in the world, who were not on a professional team roster, 
earned less than $35,000 in 1988 in a completely free market. By way of comparison, in 
1989 Chicago Bears star linebacker Mike Singletary earned $750,000 and Hall of Fame 
Quarterback Dan Marino earned just shy of $1.5 million. Rodney Fort, NFL Salaries 1989 
(1989), available at https://umich.app.box.com/s/41707f0b2619c0107b8b/1/320026231 
/2560907831/1. If a development squad player’s value in a free market is that low, we 
believe it is highly probable that, even at a major program like Ohio State or Alabama, an 
untested recruit will not be worth the full cost of education. Josephine R. Potuto, William 
H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate 
Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 918–33. 
114 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984). 
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a procompetitive economic justification for anticompetitive 
conduct.115 
Fourth, antitrust law is not the most effective means of ensuring 
that revenues generated by these sports more effectively further a 
university’s academic mission and student-athletes’ welfare or that 
big-time collegiate sports programs do not exploit student-athletes 
and consumers. Although the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable 
conduct, it does not require reasonable conduct. Nor is it “well-suited 
to externally regulate NCAA internal governance of intercollegiate 
athletics, particularly rules and agreements that define this unique 
brand of athletic competition and the permissible scope of a 
university’s relationship with its student-athletes.”116 
Finally, a piecemeal approach by way of antitrust litigation that 
merely considers the legality of the particular challenged restraint will 
not effectively solve systemic problems inherent in the production of 
commercialized intercollegiate athletics by institutions of higher 
education. These problems include an overemphasis on winning and 
generating sports-related revenues, a misallocation of scarce 
university resources to the athletic department, subordination of 
higher education academic values to the forces of commercialization, 
and student-athletes’ inability to realize the educational benefits of the 
collegiate experience.117 
VI 
EXTERNAL REGULATION BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION IS THE 
BETTER SOLUTION 
The commercial/education model calls for the continued operation 
of big-time commercial sports on college campuses. At least three 
aspects of this model suggest that its continuation is in the public 
interest. First, the affiliation with the collegiate tradition provides 
entertainment value and public cohesion among alumni and the 
community in ways that a purely professional minor sports 
competition cannot provide. Second, the commitment to integrate 
 
115 Cf. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1978) 
(holding that restricting bidding is illegal anticompetitive action); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that making coaching 
positions available to younger people and cost reduction are not valid procompetitive 
justifications). 
116 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 837. 
117 Id. at 801–04. 
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athletics with education that makes the model work provides 
distinctive societal benefits by providing athletically gifted young 
men and women with college education opportunities they might not 
otherwise have. Third, if the NCAA’s constitutional goal of “prudent 
investment” were taken seriously, it enables financially struggling 
universities with the potential ability to support teaching and research 
through subsidies from surplus funds generated by the school’s 
intercollegiate athletics program. 
This model inevitably results in economic cross-subsidies, 
effective in furthering socially worthy objectives only if NCAA 
member schools agree to fund academic support programs for 
student-athletes, non-revenue sports, and university teaching and 
research programs with surpluses. Surplus funds, in a completely 
professionalized market, would be dissipated through competition by 
paying top stars a sum equal to their short-run economic value to their 
respective teams. As demonstrated above, any decision to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior, in order to advance economic justifications 
that do not promote competition, should not be entrusted entirely to a 
private organization or its members. Nor can this model effectively 
ensure that athletes and their fellow classmates benefit in a socially 
desirable way from these surpluses if such a judgment is left to each 
university. Thus, we propose a flexible regulatory regime that will 
more reliably effectuate the public interest in intercollegiate sports 
than the current system of NCAA monolithic control and domination 
subject only to piecemeal and ineffectual antitrust review. 
In perhaps the best antitrust decision in legal history, Judge 
William Howard Taft (later President and United States Supreme 
Court Chief Justice) forcefully condemned judicial decisions that 
“have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which have 
no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the 
mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in 
the public interest, and how much is not.”118 The jurisprudential 
lesson is that this Solomon-like power, if not to be exercised by 
unelected federal judges, should lie with our elected representatives in 
Congress. They do have the power to exempt specific private 
economic conduct from the federal antitrust laws and to protect public 
welfare through an alternative regulatory scheme. To ensure that the 
public and student-athletes who participate in big-time intercollegiate 
 
118 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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athletics realize the full benefits of the commercial/educational model 
of intercollegiate athletics, we propose that Congress do so. 
An independent commission overseeing big-time intercollegiate 
athletics would serve a number of socially beneficial functions. It 
would limit the ability of those wielding power within the NCAA to 
adopt rules and make decisions that unduly exploit consumers, 
student-athletes, and other stakeholders. It would also avoid the 
problem of socially suboptimal internal rules and governance that 
necessarily arise when participating members govern a sport in their 
own parochial self-interest. By creating an independent regulatory 
commission with rule-making authority to ensure that surplus 
revenues generated by big-time intercollegiate sports are spent on 
socially worthy causes, voluntary adoption of the commission’s rules 
by the NCAA and its member universities would justify providing 
their implementation with immunity from antitrust challenges. 
We propose that federal intercollegiate athletics reform legislation 
contain the following key features: 
1. Creation of an independent commission and mandate 
procedures assuring transparency and access to all 
stakeholders, including a process akin to the notice-and-
comment requirements of informal rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.119 
2. Inclusion of certain specific substantive provisions discussed 
infra that would ensure that big-time intercollegiate athletics 
are reformed in a socially beneficial way and that the 
commercial/education model operates consistent with the 
public interest. 
3. Authorization for the Commission to promulgate non-binding 
proposed rules to regulate intercollegiate athletics and direct 
the Commission to consider and adopt, reject, or modify 
specific proposals that do not warrant congressional mandate. 
4. A grant of antitrust immunity to any university, athletic 
conference, or the NCAA for conduct taken in compliance 
 
119 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). The notice requirement includes: a description of the 
rule, the legal authority and the time and place that the public can comment; “interested 
persons” must have the opportunity to submit “written data, views, or arguments with or 
without opportunity for oral presentation”; and it must be published at least thirty days 
before enactment with a statement considering the public submissions. Id. § 553; see also 
JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 508–12 (6th ed. 2009). 
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with the Commission’s rules, provided that any stakeholder 
allegedly harmed by these entities’ conduct in compliance with 
the subject rule(s) may seek independent review to ensure that 
the rules have a reasoned basis consistent with the public 
interest. 
A variety of professional sports organizations throughout the 
world, as well as consumers, have benefited from regulation by an 
entity independent of the participating competitors. One of us has 
previously detailed the benefits to stock car racing of NASCAR’s 
independent role as a competition organizer.120 Key regulations 
relating to integrity and other specific issues in North American major 
professional sports leagues (e.g., MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL), whose 
members are independently owned and operated clubs with divergent 
economic interests, have been effectively governed by an independent 
commissioner with broad best interests of the game authority.121 In 
Australia, the sport of rugby was recently reorganized with the 
creation of an independent commission to achieve the potentially 
conflicting goals of organizing a commercially successful major 
league club competition, training and developing national teams in 
international representative competitions, and supporting amateur and 
grass-roots development of the sport.122 An independent commission 
would likely yield similar benefits with regard to the conflict-laden 
arena of rule-making in big-time college sports. 
Adherence to mandatory procedures, including those equivalent to 
informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, would 
significantly increase the transparency and inclusiveness of 
commission rulemaking in contrast to the current structure of 
economically self-serving rulemaking by NCAA member universities. 
This process would particularly facilitate the opportunity for student-
 
120 ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 76, at 70–107. 
121 As detailed by the court in Milwaukee American Association v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 
(N.D. Ill. 1931), MLB owners responded to their own inability to respond effectively to 
the “Black Sox” match-fixing scandal marring the 1919 World Series by appointing an 
independent commissioner “with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot.” Id. 
at 299. However, today baseball’s commissioner does not have such unlimited powers. 
Unless a matter “involves the integrity of, or public confidence in, the national game of 
Baseball,” the Commissioner may not regulate with regard to a host of matters that the 
MLB Constitution assigns to the clubs collectively or individually. MLB, MAJOR LEAGUE 
CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 4 (2008); WEILER ET AL., supra note 89, at 27. Nor can the MLB 
Commissioner be relied upon to protect various stakeholders from exploitation, given the 
retained ability of MLB owners to fire the Commissioner. 
122 See Australian Rugby League Commission, NRL.COM, http://www.nrl.com/About 
/ARLCommission/tabid/10891/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
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athletes’ perspectives to be heard.123 Moreover, a procedural 
requirement that the commission provide a reasoned explanation for 
its regulatory decisions (akin to that required for informal 
rulemaking) would allow for greater transparency in how conflicting 
objectives were accommodated and limit the ability of NCAA 
universities and their representatives to lobby the commission for 
rules that advance their own economic interests to the detriment of 
others or to engage in unchallenged pretextual reasoning. Finally, 
because the proposed legislation would confer antitrust immunity for 
conduct that complies with commission regulations, this procedure 
will require the commission to consider traditional competition policy 
objections to proposed regulations. Furthermore, the commission 
must explain why the public interest is served by what courts 
applying antitrust law might find to be an anticompetitive practice 
without an overriding procompetitive economic justification.124 
It is both sound policy and sound politics to expect that, for this 
legislation to warrant Congress’s time and attention (and ultimately 
its enactment), a core of three mandatory substantive requirements 
need to be included therein to ensure that big-time intercollegiate 
athletics are reformed in a socially beneficial manner. 
First, schools should be required to guarantee at least a four-year 
athletic scholarship, “which may be taken away only for failing to 
meet minimum academic requirements, engaging in misconduct, or 
voluntarily choosing not to continue playing a sport.”125 The practice 
of running a player off a squad because the coach determines that a 
more gifted athlete could better use the athletic scholarship is 
inconsistent with the commercial/education model of intercollegiate 
athletics and crosses the line of demarcation into professional sports. 
Likewise, in sports in which partial scholarships are permitted, the 
student-athlete should be protected from a scholarship reduction 
except as a consequence of unsatisfactory academic performance or 
misconduct. The public interest in wider educational access afforded 
by intercollegiate athletics is frustrated if athletic considerations result 
in a student’s loss of opportunity to obtain a degree. 
 
123 Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 5, 22. 
124 Congress could invite or mandate competition advocacy by the Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission to provide the commission 
with expert analysis of the extent to which its regulations would immunize otherwise 
illegal practices. 
125 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 838. 
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Second, schools should be required to provide free medical care or 
health insurance for all sports-related injuries. Injured student-athletes 
should also receive a scholarship extension for a period of time equal 
to the time the athlete is medically unable to attend class due to 
injury.126 
Third, the NCAA should be required to eliminate its requirement 
that any university seeking to participate in a Division I sports 
competition must operate at least fourteen sports at the Division I 
level.127 The legislation should authorize the commission to permit 
the NCAA to condition a university’s receipt of NCAA championship 
revenues in excess of expenses on the use of those funds for specified 
purposes, including the operation of additional sports. However, our 
view of the commercial/education model suggests that universities 
should have the freedom to make their own independent judgment as 
to whether funding a large number of non-revenue sports at the 
Division I level is the best use of these revenues, or whether these 
revenues should be devoted instead to academic endeavors such as 
teaching and research.To provide an oversimplified illustration, if a 
school were to determine that operating a Division I men’s basketball 
program serves its educational mission, and complies with Title IX by 
operating an equivalent women’s basketball program,128 for it to then 
be required to spend funds it would prefer to spend on English 
professors in order to fund Division I lacrosse and tennis programs is 
both unsound social policy as well as inconsistent with the NCAA’s 
own principles calling for athletic programs to be operated as an 
integral part of the educational program.129 
To facilitate the success of our proposed federal legislation, we 
believe that its mandatory substantive provisions should be limited. 
However, in exercising its rule-making authority, we believe the 
following ideas warrant the commission’s consideration: 
 “Mandatory remedial assistance and tutoring for entering 
student-athletes whose indexed academic credentials are below a 
 
126 Id. at 840. 
127 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 20.9.6. 
128 More than forty years ago, Congress enacted Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, evidencing its intention that providing equal 
athletic participation opportunities to both men and women is a socially worthy public 
policy objective, a judgment we do not seek to question. Moreover, we are not advocating 
that Title IX be amended as part of our proposal for reform of big-time intercollegiate 
athletics. 
129 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1. 
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certain percentile—twenty-fifth percentile, for example—for 
their university’s freshman class.”130 
 “The creation of a postgraduate scholarship program 
administered by the NCAA and funded by a designated 
percentage of the total net revenues generated by intercollegiate 
football and men’s basketball, and perhaps other sports, 
including the sales of merchandise incorporating aspects of 
student-athletes’ persona, such as team jerseys with numbers 
identifying individual players.”131 
 Redefining a “full athletic scholarship” to provide additional 
funds in a manner that would not compromise the “clear line of 
demarcation” between college and professional sports; for 
example, a “full” scholarship might include, in addition to 
tuition, fees, books, supplies, and minimal room and board, 
funds for additional housing, clothing, travel home, and modest 
personal spending that would not exceed the amount that is 
received from family sources by the top quartile of students at 
the athlete’s university. 
 Permitting partial athletic scholarships in all sports with an 
active program to supplement this aid with need-based aid.132 
 Reducing the overall number of scholarships for big-time college 
football.133 
 Requiring university trustees to adopt procedures to explicitly 
consider teaching and research alternatives to the investment in 
intercollegiate athletic programs that are not financially self-
supporting.134 
 
130 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 840. 
131 Id. at 841. 
132 One of us has previously detailed why this proposal would facilitate a more-
informed choice of schools by athletic recruits and promote output-increasing competitive 
balance. Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 952–58. 
133 One of us has previously detailed why this proposal would facilitate output-
increasing competitive balance while affording the university cost savings to be used on 
other socially worthy causes. Id. 
134 ASS’N OF GOVERNING BDS. OF UNIVS. & COLLS, supra note 23, at 3 
(recommending that university’s board of trustees “should act decisively to uphold the 
integrity of the athletics program and its alignment with the academic mission of the 
institution”); see also RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 9 (“We believe that Boards of 
Trustees, presidents, commissioners, athletics directors, and the public more generally, 
should focus on the objective of bringing greater alignment between athletic and academic 
expenditures at the institutional level as a way of preserving the virtues and benefits of 
intercollegiate athletics and teaching and research on each of our campuses.”). 
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 Requiring schools to offer additional scholarship aid to student-
athletes who leave school in good academic standing and later 
seek to complete their college education. 
 Requiring schools to offer financial or other incentives, such as a 
graduation bonus, to student-athletes, or at the very least to at-
risk student-athletes to increase graduation rates for Division I 
football and men’s basketball. 
 Requiring each Division I university’s intercollegiate athletics 
department to be financially self-sufficient (i.e., its revenues 
exceed its expenses over a designated period, such as three to 
five years). This would give each university the flexibility to 
determine which mix of sports to offer and invest in to achieve 
its individualized academic and intercollegiate athletics mission 
consistent with Title IX.135 
 Requiring the NCAA to distribute a significant percentage of 
pooled football and men’s basketball revenues to reward 
individual universities for achieving objectives consistent with 
values of intercollegiate athletics (e.g., high graduation rates) 
and to determine whether additional redistribution of pooled 
funds to facilitate competitive balance in big-time football and 
men’s basketball would maximize overall fan appeal or serve 
other distinctive interests.136 
We do not advocate that the commission’s regulations have the 
direct force of law. Rather, we recommend that the legislation provide 
that the NCAA, along with the individual institutions and athletic 
conferences that voluntarily opt to adhere to the entirety of 
commission regulations, receive a statutory immunity for conduct 
 
135 Cf. Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 949. 
136 See Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 21–22 (“[E]qualizing the distribution of revenue may 
address both the goal of promoting greater competitive balance and the goal of containing 
costs. Serendipitously, it may also rebalance the scales in favor of educational attainment 
and educational growth. . . . Importantly, revenue redistribution can accomplish the 
important goal of changing the incentives facing intercollegiate athletics by lowering the 
distribution tied to commercial success and raising the distribution tied to educational 
success. . . . [I]n 2011-12 the NCAA distributed $467 million [to Division I universities].   
. . .[But] none of the $467 million is allocated according to the academic success of 
student-athletes or other measures of school educational success. Restructuring these 
NCAA distributions, then, would not only be desirable from the perspective of financial 
solvency and blunting the incentives toward commercialism, but also from the perspective 
of incentivizing schools’ focus on educational outcomes.”). At the same time, we note that 
the empirical evidence from professional sports does not clearly demonstrate that, from a 
commercial or consumer-welfare perspective, increased competitive balance is necessarily 
desirable for big-time sports. See, e.g., Stefan Szymanksi, The Economic Design of 
Sporting Contests, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1153–55 (2003). 
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taken in compliance with the regulations. This will exempt them from 
liability under federal antitrust statutes and state laws that might 
outlaw practices implemented pursuant to these rules as contrary to 
state antitrust law, common law, or public policy. 
In order to ensure that the public interest is truly served by such an 
exemption, it is essential that there be external legal review of the 
commission’s regulations. Judicial review of commission decisions 
under the Administrative Procedure Act is one means to provide 
oversight. However, court dockets are crowded, and federal judges 
often lack expertise in this area. For this reason, we advocate 
conditioning antitrust immunity on the willingness of the NCAA, 
athletic conferences, and individual schools to submit disputes over 
whether a commission regulation is the product of open and 
transparent procedures and reasoned decision-making to private 
arbitration. We suggest that Congress borrow from the Ted Stevens 
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act,137 which requires that disputes 
between Olympic sport athletes and national governing bodies for 
these sports be resolved by final and binding arbitration pursuant to 
the American Arbitration Association’s commercial arbitration 
procedures.138 
 
137 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2012). 
138 Id. § 220509. The legislation would therefore clearly protect the NCAA and its 
member institutions against antitrust litigation for adhering to rules adopted by the 
commission that meet procedural standards. Different considerations arise considering 
litigation accusing the NCAA or a university of improperly failing to follow commission 
regulations with regard to specific conduct (for example, an eligibility determination for a 
student-athlete). In this instance, we believe that de novo arbitration, again akin to that 
provided for in the Stevens Act for specific competition-related determinations made by 
national governing boards, is the best model. To illustrate, suppose that the commission 
enacted regulations barring intercollegiate athletics participation for student-athletes who 
knowingly received payment for athletics participation from a professional sports club, 
and that this regulation was either upheld under administrative review or not challenged in 
a timely manner. This would bar a student-athlete ruled ineligible by the NCAA from 
challenging the action on the grounds that the rule itself was unlawful. But suppose the 
plaintiff sued on the grounds that the NCAA had incorrectly determined that he had 
violated the rule. We propose that the commission adopt a separate regulation that student-
athletes can be required, as a condition of intercollegiate athletics participation, to submit 
all disputes to binding arbitration. This would mean that the eligibility question would be 
reviewed quickly and finally by an independent arbitrator. (Alternatively, the NCAA 
would have the option of preserving its own prerogative to determine eligibility 
unconstrained by outside arbitration, but then risk antitrust exposure in the event that a 
plaintiff could demonstrate that their ruling was not in compliance with the commission’s 
rules as well as otherwise stated in an antitrust claim.). 
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Mandating binding arbitration for disputes otherwise immune from 
federal or state antitrust challenges serves several purposes. It ensures 
that the regulatory commission policies are truly based on reasoned 
decisions. Where public policies—including those inconsistent with 
free competition—are preferred, review similar to that used by courts 
to review decisions of administrative agencies assures that the 
commissioners articulate justifications. The legislation should provide 
that arbitral review of the commission’s immunity-conferring 
regulations be akin to rational basis judicial review of informal rule 
making139 (not de novo review), ensure that stakeholders were 
afforded the ability to comment on the proposed rule, and that the 
commission explained its rationale for making its rule and for 
rejecting alternatives. 
At the same time, one of the primary reasons for using arbitration 
to resolve sports-related disputes is the need for, and the ability of 
private arbitration to provide, a speedy resolution of time-sensitive 
issues. Legislation could provide a short window of perhaps fifteen to 
thirty days for those adversely affected by a commission regulation to 
demand arbitration and mandate that an arbitral panel render its 
decision within forty-five to sixty days of a hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
A commercial/education model for intercollegiate athletics posits 
that major colleges and universities will offer popular and 
commercially lucrative sporting entertainment as part of an integrated 
scheme that provides athletically-gifted students with increased 
educational opportunities and uses surplus funds generated by big-
time football and men’s basketball for socially worthy causes. The 
current structure of self-interested internal governance by the 
NCAA’s member universities, combined with external micro-
regulation by means of antitrust and contract law litigation on a case-
by-case basis, is not the most effective means to achieve this 
objective. The existing internal rulemaking process used by the 
NCAA and its member schools has not adequately achieved the 
NCAA’s own objectives of protecting student-athletes from 
commercial exploitation, ensured that all student-athletes receive the 
educational opportunities inherent in making intercollegiate athletics 
an integral part of a university’s educational mission, established rules 
essential to clearly demarcate college and professional sports, 
 
139 See MASHAW, MERRILL & SHANE, supra note 119, at 514–18. 
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prevented the adoption of rules with the primary purpose or effect of 
promoting self-interested university interests under the rubric of 
competitive equity, and ensured that intercollegiate athletic 
departments are operated by individual schools in a fiscally prudent 
manner. 
A federal regulatory commission would have the necessary 
authority to establish rules that effectively prevent intercollegiate 
athletics from crossing the line between a commercial/education 
model and a commercial/professional model for intercollegiate sports, 
enhance the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics, promote 
more competitive balance in intercollegiate sports competition, and 
require university athletic departments to operate with fiscal 
responsibility. The “carrot” of antitrust immunity would provide the 
NCAA, athletic conferences, and their member institutions with a 
significant incentive to adopt and comply with its rules to achieve 
these objectives, which would be the product of a transparent process 
in which all stakeholders (including student-athletes) and members of 
the public would have a full opportunity to be heard by the 
independent commission. 
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